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TIBOR GLANT
THE ROLE OF CALVINISM IN PRESIDENT WILSON'S
RELATIONSHIP TO HUNGARY DURING
WORLD WAR I.1
With a large number of contradictory interpretations of his
personality and policies and with many American historians jealously
guarding his image as the New World's last moral idealist, Thomas
Woodrow Wilson remains difficult to understand.2 What all accounts of
Wilson's life and policies share, though, is the emphasis on his
Calvinism. Wilson's stern belief in his own chosenness reinforced his
belief in America being a model for the rest of the world, and the two
together came to be the guiding principles of his wartime policies.
The following essay is a revised version of the author's lecture at the 28th Duquesne
History Forum, held in Pittsburgh, 20—22 October 1994. The author would like to
express his gratitude to Prof. Peter Pastor of Montclair State University, MD, for his
useful comments on the paper, and Prof. Steven Béla Várdy and the Rev. Aladár
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2 Literally, hundreds of books have been written about Wilson. To name but a few of
the most important ones: William E. Dodd, Woodrow Wilson and His Work. (New
York, 1920); August Heckscher, Woodrow Wilson. A Biography. (New York, 1991);
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During the World War Wilson tried to act as the bringer of peace first 
as mediator then through military intervention. When in April 1917 he
defined the global conflict as a struggle between the forces of good and
evil and asked Congress to declare war on Germany it became clear
that he was ready and willing to lead his country even into an armed
conflict to establish the US as primus inter pares in a new world order.
That Calvinism played an all-important role in shaping Wilson's
moral universe and foreign policies—the American historian Arthur
Stanley Link defined the latter as 'missionary diplomacy'3—must be
attributed to the influence of his father, the Presbyterian Minister
Joseph Ruggles Wilson. Although the subject of a sometimes over-
heated debate, this father-son relationship, as well as Wilson's
childhood inhibitions and failures, are generally understood to have
shaped his unshakable belief in his own chosenness.4
In sharp contrast with the extensive coverage of Wilson's
Calvinism, his Hungarian policies, especially before and during the
World War, have largely been neglected by historians. Subsequently,
such assessments are based upon «speculation5 and have yielded two
strange misconceptions. First, Wilson's 1912 statement that he was an
expert on Austro-Hungarian affairs has been taken for granted and
echoed by many historians without reservation. Second, due to
Wilson's role in the dismemberment of Hungary during 1918—1919 he
has been accused of anti-Hungarian sentiments. Neither of these
3 Arthur Stanley link, Wilson, the Diplomatist A Look at His Major Foreign Policies. 
(Baltimore, 1957) is centered around this theme.
4 Sigmund Freud and William Christian Bullitt, Woodrow Wilson, Twenty-eighth
President of the United States. A Psychological Study. (Cambridge, MA, 1966);
Alexander L. and Juliette L. George, Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House. A 
Personality Study. (New York, 1956); Edwin A. Weinstein, Woodrow Wilson: A 
Medical and Psychological Biography. (Princeton, 1981).
5 These are mostly studies of the dismemberment of the Habsburg Empire. See for
example: Fejtő Ferenc, Rekviem egy hajdanvolt birodalomért. Ausztria-Magyarország 
szétrombolása. (Budapest, 1990); Leo Valiani, The End of Austria-Hungary. (London,
1973); Arthur J. May, The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy. 2 vols. (Philadelphia, 
1966).
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arguments actually holds water and before progressing to the details of
Wilson's Hungarian connections these issues need to be cfarified.
Wilson's academic writings and his wartime utterances and policies
hardly prove his expertise in (Austro-) Hungarian matters. True, in four 
of his academic writings he addressed the problems of the Monarchy
and Hungary but his output is far from convincing. His first such piece
was an early essay on Bismarck in which he did not even mention
Hungary and dealt with the Habsburg Empire only superficially.6
Written in 1889, The State, Wilson's next piece discussing the
Monarchy, is considered to be one of the highlights of his academic
career. It is a lengthy exposition on the theory and practice of the state
during human history; and it was within this frame of reference that the
would-be President discussed Austria-Hungary and offered an—
especially by contemporary American standards—impressive account
of the dualist system. That he paid little if any attention to detail was
manifested in his rather strange interpretation of the 'rule of the
Magyar gentry' in the separate sub-section on Hungary. That
notwithstanding, this fifteen-page section in The State remains Wilson's
longest, best and most quoted piece on (Austria-) Hungary.7 In 1908 in
Constitutional Government in the United States Wilson compared the
Magna Carta of England and the Golden Bull of Hungary in a way
which makes one feel that he should have left the question alone:
For all she made a similar beginning, Hungary did not obtain
constitutional government, and England did. Undoubtedly the
chief reason was that the nobles of Hungary contended for the
privileges of a class, while the barons of England contended
for the privileges of a nation, and that the Englishmen were
not seeking to set up any new law or privilege, but to recover
and reestablish what they already had and feared they should
6 Prince Bismarck" in: Arthur Stanley Link, et al., eds., The Papers of Woodrow 
Wilson. 66 vols. (Princeton, 1966—94) 1: 307—14. (Hereafter: WWPs). 
7 Thomas Woodrow Wilson, The State. Elements of Historical and Practical Politics. 
rev. ed. (Boston, 1904): 334—48. (Hereafter: Wilson, The State). 
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lose. Another and hardly less significant reason was that the
Englishmen provided machinery for the maintenance of the
agreement, and the Magyars did not.8
This quote does speak volumes but not of Wilson's expertise in the
field but of his unconcealed WASP superiority complex; which would
reappear in a strikingly similar public statement during the 1912
election campaign.9 The future President's fourth academic reference
to Hungary also fails to show him as an expert. In the fifth and final 
volume of his A History of the American People (1902) he revealed his
views about Hungarian, Polish and Italian immigrants with a then
typical arrogance towards New Immigrants, which earned him a lot of
trouble in 1912. According to Wilson, after 1890:
there came multitudes of men of the lowest class from the
south of Italy and men of the meaner sort out of Hungary and
Poland, men out of the ranks where there was neither skill nor
energy nor any initiative of quick intelligence; and they came
in numbers which increased from year to year, as if the
countries of the south of Europe were disburdening
themselves of the more sordid and hapless elements of their
population, the men whose standards of life and work were
such as American workmen had never dreamed of hitherto.10
8 Thomas Woodrow Wilson, Constitutional Government in the United States. (New
York, 1908. Reprint New York, 1961): 6.
9 In the opening address of his Connecticut state campaign, on 25 September 1912,
Wilson stated: "Why, in that ancient Kingdom of Hungary, for example,
contemporary with the great Magna Carta, to which we look back as the source of
our constitutional liberties, there was proclaimed upon a notable day the terms of
the Great Golden Bull which ran almost in the identical terms of the Magna Carta.
But Hungary never could get a foothold for the execution of those principles until
she began to send eager multitudes across the ocean to find in America what they
had vainly hoped for in Hungary." (WWPs 25: 256).
Thomas Woodrow Wilson, A History of the American People. 5 vols. (New York,
1902): 5: 212—13.
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The evaluation of this statement takes our discussion into the
realm of the other misconception regarding Wilson's attitudes towards
Hungary: his supposed anti-Hungarianism. This myth has sprung from
no less than three different sources. First, from the disillusionment of
the then contemporary political elite of Hungary with Wilson's
withdrawal of Point Ten of the Fourteen Points. Second, from the Rev.
László Harsányi, a New York Reformed Minister, who during his 1920
visit to Hungary began to spread the story that Wilson had actually
gotten fed up with the Hungarians during the early 1900s when he
served as the notary of New Brunswick and witnessed the rather
shocking debates of the representatives of Hungarian-American
Reformed Churches. Third, from Wilson's condemnatory statement
regarding the Hungarian-Americans, which has been cited earlier. The
first of these 'sources' is based upon a misunderstanding of Wilson's
East Central European diplomacy or, rather, the Hungarians'
unwillingness to accept his decision regarding the cancellation of Point
Ten. The second 'source', Harsányi's striking claim, has been refuted
by the late Aladár Komjáthy, the host of our workshop, who
demonstrated that the New York Minister was interpreting rather
freely Wilson's motivations and career.11 Wilson's view of the
Hungarian-Americans, commonly known as the 'hunkies', is by far the
most interesting element of this puzzle not only because it was used
against him in 1912 but also because it sheds more light upon his
overall attitudes towards Hungary.
Interestingly, Wilson's dislike of the 'hunkies' or, rather, of the
troublesome elements among them, did not go hand in hand with a 
general dislike of Hungary. To the contrary, through vhis father he
actually picked up the Republican-Protestant image of Hungary, which
was cleverly created by Kossuth during his successful 1851—52 visit to
the New World. Wilson wrote in The State: 
1 1 Komjáthy Aladár, A kitántorgott egyház. (Budapest, 1984): 171—72. (Hereafter:
Komjáthy, Kitántorgott). 
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Dominant in a larger country than Bohemia, perhaps
politically more capable than any Slavonic people, and
certainly more enduring and definite in their purposes, the
Magyars, though crushed by superior force in the field of
battle, have been able to win a specially recognized and highly
favored place in the dual monarchy. Although for a long time a 
land in which the noble was the only citizen, Hungary has
been a land of political liberties almost as long as England
herself has been.12
Wilson's adherence to the romanticized concept of a freedom-
loving and chivalrous people was thus based upon a religious twist,
which actually worked in favor of Hungary. It is easy to see that by the
beginning of the twentieth century Hungary was neither Protestant nor
democratic or republican. Everyday contacts in the New World and
minor diplomatic crises, such as the arrest of the American
Government agent Marcus Braun in Budapest in 1905,13 apparently did
not impress the American public, which did not bother to review its
concept of Hungary the way the British and the French did. This was a 
token of neither sympathy nor dislike but of an underlying lack of
interest in the affairs of Hungary on the part of the Americans. The
very same attitude seemed to characterize the writings as well as the
political conduct of Woodrow Wilson both as an academic and as Chief
Executive of the United States of America. Having thus established the
real sources and nature of his attitudes towards Hungary it is now time
to offer a brief assessment of Wilson's Hungarian contacts and policies
between January 1912 and November 1918.
Wilson's Hungarian-American contacts in 1912 provided an extra
dimension for the presidential election campaign in a peculiar way. The
1 2 Wilson, The State: 335—36.
13 A detailed introduction of this episode would extend beyond the scope of the present
study. Suffice it to say that Braun was released after President Roosevelt's
intervention on his behalf. Marcus Braun, Immigration Abuses. (New York, 1906.
Reprint: San Francisco, 1972).
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American press magnate William R. Hurst decided to back Champ
Clark in the Primaries against Wilson and it was the Hurst papers, and
not the immigrants, who picked out Wilson's earlier cited rather
unfortunate remarks about Italian, Polish and Hungarians newcomers.
In the crossfire of the attacks from the Hurst papers and the
innumerable requests by immigrants to withdraw his condemnatory
remarks,14 on 22 July 1912 Wilson finally issued the following press
statement to the Hungarian-American journalist Géza Kende of the
Amerikai Magyar Népszava:
I believe in the reasonable restriction of immigration but not
in any restriction which will exclude from the country honest
and industrious peoples who are seeking what America has
always offered, an asylum for those who seek a free field. The
whole question is a very difficult one but, I think can be solved
with justice and generosity. Any one who has the least
knowledge of Hungarian history must feel that stock to have
proved itself fit for liberty and opportunity.15
This statement would have settled the issue had Wilson not
demonstrated his WASP superiority complex yet again in the
September campaign address, which is cited in note 9. Nonetheless,
Wilson's eventual victory in the election proved the effectiveness of his
campaign manager, Frank McCombs, who later refused to be 'sent to
darkest Austria' as ambassador,16 and the fact that domestic reform
(the New Freedom) was the main issue at stake.
Testifying to good political insight and excellent tactical skills,
Wilson sought no revenge upon those involved in the campaign against
1 4 This aspect of the 1912 election campaign has largely been neglected. For
discussion and the relevant documents see: Arthur Stanley link, Wilson: The Road 
to the White House. (Princeton, 1947): 380—90; WWPs 24: 226, 241—43, 269—70,
404—07, 548—49.
1 5 See the 23 July 1912 issue of the paper. The New York Times also covered the story
on the very same day.
16 mVPs25: 614, and 27: 127.
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him; moreover, he maintained good connections with the few
Hungarian-Americans who sided with him during 1912. One such
person was the rather mysterious Edmund Gallauner, who was called
upon in 1916 to provide similar services in Wilson's campaign for
reelection.17 An even more significant personal connection for Wilson
was the New York banker Alexander Konta, arguably the most
controversial Hungarian-American figure of the entire war period. Their
relationship may hardly be described as friendship; one may say
instead that in Konta Wilson had a prominent Hungarian-American
whom he could, and willingly did, use if needed. Their post-1912
connections, therefore, deserve special attention.
1916 saw the reestablishment of the Wilson-Konta contacts over
the issue of Hungarian-American loyalties to the United States. Due to
their involvement in sabotage, which also contributed to the forced
withdrawal of the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador to Washington,
Constantin Theodore Dumba,18 Hungarian-Americans had to face
violent discrimination. Their natural reaction was a public
demonstration of their loyalty to their new home country on 30 January
1916; and their resolution was handed over to Wilson by Konta in the
White House.19 Other Hungarian-Americans, however, such as the
editors of the all-powerful Szabadság of Cleveland, considered this
move unnecessary and condemned Konta's action as offering the
Hungarian-American vote to the President.20 Thus, at a time when
Konta reentered the limelight in the White House his position was
undermined in immigrant circles by the attacks in the press.
1 7 library of Congress: Thomas Woodrow Wilson Papers: Series 4: Case Files: no.
5080: Edmund Gallauner. (Hereafter: LC TWWP).
1 8 For Dumba's own account see: Constantin Theodore Dumba, Memoirs of a 
Diplomat. (London, 1933).
1 9 LC TWWP: Series 4: Case Files: No. 2898: Alexander Konta; WWPs 36: 205; Puskás
Julianna, Kivándorló magyarok az Egyesült Államokban, 1880—1940. (Budapest,
1982): 303—15.
2 0 In the 29 February 1916 issue of the paper.
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The other Konta-Wilson encounter, the longest and final one,
began in November 1917 and ended sometime during the early
summer of 1918. First privately, in November 1917, then publicly as the
head of the American-Hungarian Loyalty League, which was
established under the auspices of Wilson's own propaganda agency, the
Committee on Public Information, Konta accused the Hungarian-
American Reformed Churches of spying and sabotaging America-
nization. Search warrants were issued and carried out but no definitive
evidence was found, which led to Konta's removal from government
circles once and for all.21 Meanwhile, in order to silence the rather
heated debate in Hungarian-American circles, Wilson granted a brief
audience to a delegation of Reformed Ministers on 8 July 1918.22 This
event, which happened to be Wilson's last direct Hungarian-American
contact during the war, may be interpreted in two different ways. It has
been argued that this was a clearcut demonstration of the fact that
Konta's accusations had been unfounded 23 An alternative explanation
would be that Wilson, although aware of the intentions and activities of
the Hungarian-American Reformed Churches, decided to close his eyes
and create a domestic consensus to secure support for his foreign
policies.
As for such policies, Wilson proved to be a conservative reformer,
at least in the Habsburg case. He publicly voiced his dislike of the
nature of Habsburg rule in the Monarchy as early as December 1914,24
but refused to join the dismemberment camp until the summer of 1918.
In fact, he even refused to meet separatist politicians from the
Habsburg Empire until well after the American declaration of war on
21 WWPs 45:135—40; Komjáthy, Kitántorgott: 141—42.
22 Szabadság, 9 July 1918. Edmund (Ödön) Vasváry was among them.
2 3 Komjáthy, Kitántorgott 144.
2 4 In an interview with Henry Bruce Brougham of The New York Times Wilson
contended: "Austria-Hungary will go to pieces altogether—ought to go to pieces for
the welfare of Europe." (WWs31: 459).
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the Dual Monarchy.25 The guiding principle of Wilson's East Central
European policy until the summer of 1918 was the removal of Austria-
Hungary from the war preferably by a separate peace. Only when it
became clear that this policy would not work did Wilson decide to go
for the more radical option: dismemberment.26 Yet, even after casting
his vote for the independence of the Czechs and the South Slavs, the
American President sought to establish some sort of regional
integration in the Danubain Basin; and this remained the chief concern
for his task force for peace preparations, the Inquiry. Interestingly,
Wilson refused to consider the alternative to full dismemberment, the
removal of Austria-Hungary from the war through the separation of
Hungary from Austria.
Actually, the stage for such a move was set by Tisza's mid-1917
removal and his widely cited assessment of the situation: 'this is
nothing short of revolution'27 Meanwhile in December 1917, Fiorello
LaGuardia, the future Mayor of New York City then serving in the US
Signal Corps in Italy, proposed direct undercover action in support of
Károlyi, which Wilson rejected on moral grounds.28 Wilson's
categorical refusal, however, was not the outcome of careful 
consideration: with the reports of the Sate Department and of Military
and Naval Intelligence casting no light upon the situation in Hungary 29
2 5 It is common knowledge that Masaryk was the first such politician whom Wilson
saw, in mid-June, 1918.
Wilson's wartime utterances as well as the memoirs of Robert Lansing, his second
Secretary of State all testify to that. See also: Frank P. Chambers, The War Behind 
the War, 1914—1918. A History of the Political and Civilian Fronts. (London, 1939);
Victor S. Mamatey, The United States and East-Central Europe, 1914—1918. A Study 
in Wilsonian Diplomacy and Propaganda. (Princeton, 1957).
Apparently first cited in the 16 June 1917 issue of The New Republic. 
National Archives, Washington, D.C.: Record Group 59: Decimal Files of the
Department of State: M 708: reel 3: Thomas Nelson Page to Lansing, 29 December
1917; Wilson to Lansing, 1 January 1918.
^9 This statement is based upon an extensive reading of the relevant State Department
and Intelligence files in the National Archives.
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Wilson could not have realized that such a move would have been
doomed to failure. Simply, he was reluctant to take such a drastic step
as early as the turn of 1917—18. On top of that, Wilson developed
serious reservations about Károlyi, who had toured the United States in
the company of 'socialists' (Kunfi, etc.) in 1914.30 While Károlyi enjoyed
a surprisingly strong support in the American press Wilson continued
to disregard him during 1917 considering the Hungarian aristocrat to
be politically weightless. Károlyi was also unacceptable for personal
reasons; namely because he was reportedly in regular contact with the
Hungarian feminist Rosika Bédy-Schwimmer, who due to an act of
indiscretion back in September 1914, was considered persona non grata
in the Wilson White House.31
On the strength of the above considerations one may say that
Wilson did not develop a coherent Hungarian policy during the World
War, nor was he by any means hostile towards the lesser half of the
lesser Central Power. Wilson represented the then typical American
romanticizing attitude towards Hungary, which he abandoned for
personal reasons (Károlyi, Bédy-Schwimmer) and due to unforeseen
changes in global high politics during the early summer of 1918. His
sympathy for Kossuth's Protestant-Republican Hungary of some 70
years before was gradually replaced by a new set of preferences,
especially Czech orientation, which later guided his conduct in East
Central European affairs at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919.
3 0 Gróf Károlyi Mihály, Hit, illúziók nélkül. (Budapest, 1977): 62—63. Konta tried in
vain to fix an interview for Károlyi with Wilson through McCombs: WWPs 29: 404,
407.
3 1 Barbara S. Kraft, The Peace Ship. Henry Ford's Pacifist Adventure in the First World 
War. (New York and London, 1978): 10—11. Later in 1918 Károlyi appointed Bédy-
Schwimmer to Berne and the Americans forced her withdrawal; see: Peter Pastor,
The Diplomatic Fiasco of the Modern World's First Woman Ambassador, Rosa
Bédy-Schwimmer. in: East European Quarterly; vol. 8 no. 3 (1975): 273—82.
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